"The Europeans-only exclusion rule is illegitimate"
Nothing less than the fundaments of the European Union were questioned by Andrea Sangiovanni, Professor of Philosophy at King's College London, in his recent lecture "The EU excludes non-European countries from accession: Is it right to do so?". The answer he gave was provocative and hotly debated: it is not. Rather, the Europeans-only exclusion rule is illegitimate. Sangiovanni's lecture was part of the series on "The Future of the Fiscal State and the Social State in the European Union", organised by the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy and the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
His arguments were manifold and drew on very different approaches: First, the freedom of association had limits – as recognised by every democracy, Sangiovanni said. In particular, international organisations such as the EU owed the public accountability. Unlike individuals, they didn't have expressive or intimate interests in associations that would justify the establishment of an exclusive "club of states".
Second, the Europeans-only exclusion rule can be regarded as wrongfully discriminatory, Sangiovanni held and compared it with an Australian policy which attempted to eliminate low-wage migration to Australia by forbidding non-Europeans from immigrating. In this context, Sangiovanni emphasised that discrimination is about social subordination. To determine what counts as social subordination, one had to take a closer look at social meanings.
Third, the social meaning of the Europeans-only exclusion rule had its basis particularly in two aspects of Europe's heritage: Christendom (in distinction to Islam) and – following the enlightenment era – in the claim of superiority of civilisation (against barbarism) and the white race (against other races), which were both discriminatory. As evidence, Sangiovanni cited an opinion given by the European Commission on the application of Cyprus for membership to the EU in which the Commission argued that Cyprus was "at the very fount of European culture and civilisation". Regardless of the fact that it is a divided country and therefore partly Muslim, it had been the Christian heritage that secured its membership, Sangiovanni said.
He also rejected the desire to protect the public culture as sound argument to justify the exclusion rule. "What's the point in protecting a European culture?", he asked, "Europe is no nation". One could furthermore argue that geographic contiguity is necessary to secure national defense. However, as the example of NATO showed, this was not a mandatory condition, Sangiovanni pointed out. Lastly, the Copenhagen criteria which must be met by accession candidates to become a full member of the EU, could also be fulfilled by states such as Canada. Since the EU is thus rather a cultural, social and political project and not just a geographical one, it should aspire to be a "cosmopolitan organisation".
In the subsequent lively discussion, Prof. Ruth Mason from the University of Virginia School of Law, USA, raised the question whether the argument was moral or legal and – as also other participants asked – whether a macro-level reasoning can be justified with an argument on the individual (micro) level. Sangiovanni clarified in his reply that the argument was a moral one, fleshed out with legal cases. In response to the second question, he countered that – regardless of the level of analyis – sovereignty had its limits when anti-discrimination rights were affected.